Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685 (Book Review) by Sewell, Keith C.
Volume 37 Number 3 Article 7 
March 2009 
Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity, 1210-1685 (Book Review) 
Keith C. Sewell 
Dordt College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege 
Recommended Citation 
Sewell, Keith C. (2009) "Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and 
the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685 (Book Review)," Pro Rege: Vol. 37: 
No. 3, 43 - 44. 
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol37/iss3/7 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections @ 
Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. 
For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu. 
Pro Rege—March 2009     43 
but an argument could be made that Glory is.  Though not 
so complex a character as Jack, Glory is engaged in her 
own quest for significance, hurt and grieving over her own 
recent past, searching for peace and a sense of  well-being 
in her life. She fears and hopes that she may have come 
home for good to Gilead. To her surprise, Jack ministers 
to her in her struggle just as she ministers so patiently and 
gently to him.  Her epiphany at the very end of  the novel, 
her recognition of  the goodness of  her life, is immensely 
satisfying.
Home is not the kind of  novel that rides along blithely 
on its plot; it moves slowly, character driven.   At some 
point you may look back over the last fifty pages you have 
read and wonder if  anything significant has happened. 
But then you recognize that you have been drawn 
forward, captivated by the subtle growth and change in 
the relationship between Glory and Jack or Jack’s ongoing 
struggle to understand his relationship with his father.
Does Home measure up to Gilead?  I think it does—as 
a work of  art.  But I do not think it will be as popular 
as Gilead, for even though Home wrestles with more 
puzzling and challenging questions than Gilead does, its 
slow pace will put some people off.  Nevertheless, it is a 
fine companion piece to Gilead.  Both novels move with 
a patient gentleness; both are inhabited by characters one 
would like to have as friends; and both evoke a sense of  
wonder (and sometimes fear) about the deep joys and 
sorrows at the core of  human existence. 
Almost sixty years ago, Herbert Butterfield published 
The Origins of  Modern Science (1949), a book that more than 
many others helped numerous students make the history 
of  science central to their understanding of  the history of  
western civilization. Butterfield’s work was significant for its 
“thinking cap” and “lantern slide” metaphors, which were so 
suggestive to Thomas S. Kuhn of  “paradigm change” fame. 
Butterfield also maintained that by uncritically reading our 
notions of  “science” back into the times of  late-medieval 
and early-modern Europe, we could be ensnaring ourselves 
in all manner of  anachronistic misperceptions from the 
crude to the subtle. Butterfield was not, of  course, without 
his precursors and contemporaries—the Americans 
George Sarton (1884-1956) and Lynn Thorndike (1882-
1965), and European giants such as Pierre Duhem (1861-
1916) and Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), had already made 
important contributions. Butterfield warned against the 
fallacies of  anachronism in the history of  science as in 
other branches of  historical study. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, for example, we can find astronomy 
and astrology intertwined in a complex web of  conjecture, 
discovery, and debate. This complex web has led some to 
seek the “origins” of  our truly “modern” science in the 
nineteenth century—after all, while the word “scientia” is of  
classical lineage, “scientist” comes to us from the century 
of  Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley. Yet such a stance 
is less than satisfactory. At the very least, it would seem 
to under-appreciate the deeper continuities of  history; our 
“modern science” is, in truth, the result of  a long process 
of  historical maturation.
In this work, Stephen Gaukroger, Professor of  History 
of  Philosophy and History of  Science at the University of  
Sydney, Australia, demonstrates two:  to account for how 
modern science emerged in the West, and to explain why 
scientific knowledge came to be regarded as the basis upon 
which all other claims to knowledge should be assessed. 
These questions cannot be settled with reference to the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries alone. Moreover, as 
soon as the longer term is taken into consideration, the 
immense impact of  Aristotelian thinking in the late-
medieval and early-modern periods must be traversed 
with care. Accordingly, Gaukroger takes the long view, 
commencing his discussions with the Paris condemnations 
of  Aristotle in 1210 and 1277 (70 f.). In truth, the synthesis 
of  Aristotelian natural philosophy and Christian theology 
that we so rightly associate with Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) 
enjoyed no smooth path to official (Papal) sanction as 
latter-day “Thomism”; instead, it encountered repeated 
challenges from both old Platonism and as well as from 
varieties of  the new Nominalism (80 f.). 
This volume traverses the broad late-medieval and 
early-modern periods. It ends with the beginnings of  
modern-style reflections on the antiquity of  man, which 
also anticipated the development of  scientific geology 
(496-503), to a point where we find ourselves on the brink 
of  Newton’s Principia Mathematica of  1687 (352-6, 462-8). 
Gaukroger is nothing but thorough; he peers 
into the nooks and crannies, explores half-forgotten 
byways, and surveys dead-ends, for these all exhibit their 
instructive moments. He helps keep us from the pitfalls 
of  anachronism by using the term “natural philosophy,” 
reminding us that this was not a single uniform enterprise 
but exhibited diverse articulations in fields such as 
mathematics, mechanics and optics (35, 253 ff.). As befits 
the author of  a full length biography (see his Descartes: An 
Intellectual Biography, 1995), Gaukroger is particularly strong 
on Descartes (1596-1650), whose philosophical project 
was a response to the perceived failure of  Thomism. 
That failure was already evident in the writings of  Pietro 
Pomponazzi (1462-1525), who had decisively called into 
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question the tenability of  Aristotelian natural philosophy 
“in its Christianized version” to “serve in the role of  a 
philosophical foundation for . . . systematic theology” 
(102).
The relationship between the Christian religion and 
the pagan thinking of  classical Greece remains one of  
the greatest questions confronting Christian thought 
and scholarship. Gaukroger does not write explicitly as a 
Christian, but he is more fully aware of  the problems than 
many contemporary Christians (7, cf. 50). More readily 
than some of  our contemporary scholastic theologians, 
he recognizes that so-called “Christian Aristotelianism” 
is an “amalgam” and not intrinsically Christian (77, 80). 
His assessment is that Catholicism’s adoption of  Thomism 
as “the official Church philosophy” represented a “finely 
balanced compromise” ultimately destined to unravel (82-
3). As he puts it later, “Aristotelian natural philosophy … 
never presented a wholly satisfactory conception of  the 
natural realm as far as Christian theology was concerned, 
because it failed to capture the single origin of  the natural 
world …” (507). Only when “natural philosophy” learned 
to abandon Aristotle (186, 324) was it possible for what 
we call “scientific progress” to emerge and achieve a 
continuous momentum. Contra-Aristotle, men such 
as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) came to understand the 
truths of  “natural philosophy” as practical and not merely 
contemplative (228). The result was an outlook that we can 
recognize as more decidedly modern, marked by a shift 
from how best to live in the world to how the world might 
be changed for the better.
For all his insights, not all of  Gaukroger’s assertions 
will pass unchallenged. Certainly, the first Jewish Christians, 
both at home and across the Diaspora, were subject to 
varying levels of  Hellenization, but not all readers will 
be ready to concur that the canonical authors Paul and 
John should be numbered among the Hellenizers (61, cf. 
83). There is an issue of  New Testament interpretation 
here that should not pass unchallenged (see also 377-
8 and 397-9), especially as Gaukroger adumbrates his 
view that it was not the physical sciences that eventually 
were to threaten the faith but the emergence of  a certain 
kind of  historical-mindedness (3, 23), perhaps because—yet 
also in spite of—Christianity itself  being so historically 
grounded. And across the extensive vistas he commands, 
it is not altogether clear that our author here achieves his 
objective of  explaining precisely why scientific knowledge 
came to be widely regarded as the basis upon which all 
other claims to knowledge would be assessed by the end 
of  the seventeenth century. Gaukroger is philosophically 
formidable, but something seems to be missing here 
historically. However, the “Preface” informs us that this is 
but the first of  five projected volumes, so patience will be 
in order as we expectantly await his conclusions.
